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CHILD CUSTODY:
PARENTAL COHABITATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
STANDARD -JARRETT V. JARRETT
Among the most difficult decisions for a court in a divorce proceeding is
which parent will be awarded custody of the children.1 Traditionally, Il-
linois has followed the established rule that child custody decisions are re-
solved in accordance with the best interest of the child. 2  Case law indicates
that Illinois courts have considered such factors as the stability of the familial
environment, 3 the physical and mental conditions of both parents 4 and the
preference of the child 5 to determine which parent will provide the more
suitable environment for the child. 6  More recently, the legislature affirmed
the importance of these considerations in determining the best interest of a
child when it passed the new Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (IMDMA). 7  These factors are included in the Act's provisions for the
initial determination of custody 8 and the subsequent modification of the cus-
tody agreement. 9
1. See Kirshner, Child Custody Determination-A Better Way!, 17 J. FAM. L. 275 (1978-
79).
2. The best interest of the child standard was initially enunciated in Nye v. Nye, 411 I1.
408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952), where the court stated, "[t]he guiding star is and must be, at all
times, the best interest of the child." Id. at 415, 105 N.E.2d at 304. See also Sommer v.
Borovic, 69 II. 2d 220, 233, 370 N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (1978) ("[tlhe court's primary concern
obviously is not the wishes of the parents but rather the best interests of child"); Marcus v.
Marcus, 24 I11. App. 3d 401, 406-07, 320 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1st Dist. 1974) ("the sole objective of
the court [is] 'to reach a decision designed to protect the child's best interest' "); Vysoky v.
Vysoky, 85 Ill. App. 2d 306, 310, 230 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1st Dist. 1967) ("the paramount concern
must always be the welfare of the children").
3. See Mason v. Mason, 49 II1. App. 3d 775, 777, 364 N.E.2d 705, 706 (4th Dist. 1977);
Holloway v. Holloway, 10 I11. App. 3d 662, 665, 294 N.E.2d 759, 761 (1st Dist. 1973); Cave v.
Cave, 2 I11. App. 3d 782, 784, 276 N.E.2d 793, 794 (5th Dist. 1971).
4. See Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 505, 388 N.E.2d 811, 813 (5th Dist. 1979);
Mason v. Mason, 49 II1. App. 3d at 777, 364 N.E.2d at 706; Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill. App. 3d
at 406, 320 N.E.2d at 584.
5. See Jines v. Jines, 63 I11. App. 3d 564, 570, 380 N.E.2d 440, 444 (5th Dist. 1978);
Strouse v. Strouse, 75 I11. App. 2d 362, 364, 220 N.E.2d 485, 486 (4th Dist. 1966); Stickler v.
Stickler, 57 II1. App. 2d 286, 287, 206 N.E.2d 720, 722 (1st Dist. 1965).
6. For a discussion of these factors, see Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current
Criteria, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 245-47 (1977).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101-802 (1977).
8. Id. § 602. This section provides:
(a) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best in-
terest:
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Despite this development of standards that were first established by case
law and are now codified, the best interest principle they embody is difficult
to apply to specific situations. In Jarrett v. Jarrett,10 the Illinois Supreme
Court had the opportunity to review a situation in which a mother, who had
been awarded custody of her children, entered into a cohabitational relation-
ship with her boyfriend." The court found that the best interest principle
necessitated removing the Jarrett children from their mother's custody be-
cause the environment in which the children were being raised endangered
their moral well-being. 12
This Note first analyzes Jarrett, the standards the Illinois Supreme Court
used in reaching its decision and the court's holding in relation to the best
interest of the child principle. In addition, the impact that this decision will
have on future child custody determinations is discussed. Finally, this Note
proposes an alternative approach that not only better comports with the
legislature's intent, but also preserves the right of parents to raise their chil-
dren as they see fit.
FACTS OF JARRE7T
On December 6, 1976, Jacqueline Jarrett was awarded a judgment for
divorce from Walter Jarrett in the Circuit Court of Cook County.1 3  The
court found Jacqueline to be a fit and proper mother and granted her the
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(b) the court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.
9. Id. § 610. Section 610 provides:
(a) No motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than 2 years
after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that
there is reason to believe the child's present environment may endanger seriously
his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
(b) The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior judgment or that were unknown to the
court at the time of entry of the prior judgment, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to
serve the best interest of the child. In applying these standards the court shall
retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the prior judgment unless:
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with consent
of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental,
moral or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of envi-
ronment is outweighed by its advantages to him.
(c) Attorney fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seeking modification if
the court finds that the modification action is vexatious and constitutes harassment.
10. 78 Il1. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, __ U.S. - (1980).
11. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 421-22.
12. Id. at 347-48, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
13. Id. at 340, 400 N.E.2d at 421. The divorce was granted on the grounds of extreme and
repeated mental cruelty. Id. at 340-41, 400 N.E.2d at 421.
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sole care, custody and control of the couple's three minor daughters. 14  In
April, 1977, Jacqueline informed Walter that her boyfriend, Wayne Ham-
mon, would be living with her and the children. Although Walter objected
to this arrangement, Hammon moved into the family home on May 1,
1977.15 The children did not expressly object to the arrangement although
they were not "overly enthused" when he first moved into their home. 16
Hammon played an active role in the children's lives. He verbally dis-
ciplined the children, attended school functions with them, played with
them and paid their allowances from his own money. 1 7  The arrangement
did not have any apparent adverse effects on the children.' 8
Jacqueline and Hammon testified at the custody modification hearing that
they had no plans to marry in the immediate future.19 Jacqueline had
explained to her children that she did not feel that it was wrong for her and
Hammon to live together unmarried, although other people had different
moral beliefs.2 0  She also testified that she believed it was important for her
children to develop their own set of values. 2 1  After Hammon moved in
with Jacqueline and the Jarrett children, Walter filed a change of custody
petition to remove the children from what he believed to be an immoral
environment. 22 The trial court found that it was in the best moral and
spiritual interests of the children to amend the original divorce decree and
award Walter the custody of his daughters.2 3 The appellate court, in revers-
ing the lower court's decision, found that the change in conditions did not
warrant a modification of the custody agreement because the presence of
Hammon did not adversely affect the children. 24
14. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 421. The divorce decree also awarded Jacqueline the use of
the family home until six months after any remarriage, as well as child support. Walter Jarrett
was allowed the right of visitation with the children at all reasonable times and hours. id.
15. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 421-22.
16. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422. The appellate court noted that on one occasion Walter
asked his oldest daughter what she thought of the situation. She said she did not object to
Hammon except when he occasionally disciplined her and her sisters. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64
IIl..App. 3d 932, 934, 382 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1st Dist. 1978).
17. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 I11. App. 3d at 934, 382 N.E.2d at 14.
18. While under Jacqueline's care, the children appeared to be clean, healthy, well dressed
and well nourished. 78 Ill. 2d at 342, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
19. Id. Jacqueline believed that it was too soon after her divorce to remarry and that a
marriage license does not create a relationship. Jacqueline also considered the divorce decree's
stipulation that she sell the family house upon remarriage, The children did not want to move
and, in any case, she would be financially unable to do so. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
20. Id. at 341-42, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
21. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 I11. App. 3d at 934, 382 N.E.2d at 14.
22. 78 II1. 2d at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
23. Id. at 342, 400 N.E.2d at 422.
24. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 111. App. 3d at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16-17. The appellate court noted
that there was no showing that Jacqueline had neglected her children. The appearance, health
and stability of the children were not adversely affected. The children attended religious train-
ing classes regularly and were taken to church every week. Absent a showing of any negative
effects on the children, the court refused to speculate as to what effect the situation might have
on the girls in the future. Id.
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THE PRESUMPTION OF UNFITNESS AND
DIRECT IMPACT APPROACHES
Illinois courts have followed two different approaches when considering
the relationship between a parent's nonmarital sexual conduct and the best
interest of the child. The first approach presumes that parental misconduct
adversely affects the child; 25 the second requires proof that the conduct is
actually detrimental to the child's well-being. 26
The presumption that a cohabitating parent is unfit to retain custody of his
or her child is founded on the proposition that such conduct is inconsistent
with the child's best interest. This approach uses the rebuttable presumption
that a parent who is engaged in a nonmarital relationship cannot provide
proper moral training for the child.2 7 Justification for removing the child
from such an environment is based upon the speculation that the child will
follow the parent's example and ultimately engage in similar conduct.2 8
The appellate court also refused to judge Jacqueline's conduct without a determination of the
effect such conduct would have on the children. In reversing the trial court's decision, the court
stated:
We do find it to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impose its own
standard in this regard and infer, without any evidence in the record, that Jac-
queline's conduct in living with a man to whom she was not married was detrimen-
tal to the welfare of the children and in and of itself sufficient to disqualify her as
the custodian of the children.
Id. at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16.
25. See Strand v. Strand, 41 11. App. 3d 651, 355 N.E.2d 47 (2d Dist. 1976); Mulvihill v.
Mulvihill, 20 II1. App. 3d 440, 314 N.E.2d 342 (1st Dist. 1974); Hahn v. Hahn, 69 I11. App. 2d
302, 216 N.E.2d 229 (2d Dist. 1966).
26. See In re Marriage of Farris, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 388 N.E.2d 232 (4th Dist. 1979);
Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (3d Dist. 1978); Collings v. Collings, 120
I11. App. 2d 125, 256 N.E.2d 108 (2d Dist. 1970).
27. In Nye v. Nye, 411 Il. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952), the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that this presumption could be rebutted by a showing that 1) the misconduct has terminated and
will not be resumed in the future, 2) the child was unaware of the conduct and 3) the conduct
did not have an adverse affect on the child.
The Nye court used this test to evaluate the fitness of a mother who had engaged in sexual
conduct with her boyfriend after receiving custody of her daughter. The mother was able to
retain custody of her child after showing that she had married her boyfriend, the child had not
witnessed any indiscretions and the misconduct had had no effect on the care which the mother
provided for her daughter. For a discussion of Nye, see Note, The Changed Circumstance Rule
in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 543 (1952).
Although the presumption is said to be rebuttable, it is often difficult to refute and therefore
becomes conclusive in practice. See Hahn v. Hahn, 69 II1. App. 2d 302, 216 N.E.2d 229 (2d
Dist. 1966) (custody of children changed to father as mother had been living openly in adultery
and there was no evidence that she would reform); Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 III. App. 2d 471,
126 N.E.2d 34 (3d Dist. 1955) (father awarded custody of his children as mother was found
guilty of adultery).
28. See Hahn v. Hahn, 69 II1. App. 2d at 305, 216 N.E.2d at 230; Kline v. Kline, 57 IlI.
App. 2d 244, 251, 205 N.E.2d 775, 777 (3d Dist. 1965). Accord, Stark v. Stark, 13 III. App. 3d
35, 38, 299 N.E.2d 605, 608 (3d Dist. 1973). See generally Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Con-
duct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 647, 663-66 (1977) (author asserts that courts use
the speculative impact justification to change the custody of a child whose parent is engaged in
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Since the supposed harm to the child's morals will not become evident
until a future time, courts using the presumption of unfitness approach do
not require an actual showing of present detriment to the child's moral de-
velopment. For example, in Gehn v. Gehn 2 9 the appellate court observed
that it may be impossible to present evidence illustrating the effect of a
mother's adulterous affair on the children. Yet, the court transferred custody
of the children to the father as it found that the mother was not providing
the children with proper moral training.30 Further, in DeFranco v. De-
Franco,31 an Illinois appellate court found that the need for proof of immi-
nent harm was precluded by section 610 of IMDMA. 32 Section 610 allows
the modification of a custody agreement if the child's present environment
endangers his or her moral health. 33 The DeFranco court recognized the
difficulty of proving a correlation between a parent's cohabitational relation-
ship and the adverse effect it may have on a child.34 Nevertheless, the court
removed the children from their cohabitating mother's custody, holding that
the possibility of the children following their mother's example was sufficient
justification under section 610 to modify the custody agreement. 35
In contrast, courts following the direct impact approach do not modify the
custody agreement unless it can be shown that the parent's nonmarital sex-
ual conduct has a direct, adverse impact on the child. These courts admit
that a parent's misconduct should be considered; however, there is no pre-
sumption of the parent's unfitness to retain custody. 36 Unlike courts using
a nonmarital sexual relationship where there is no evidence that the parent's conduct has a
present effect on the child; author suggests that such decisions are influenced by judicial at-
titudes toward certain moral values and the desire to establish a single set of moral values).
29. 51 111. App. 3d 946, 367 N.E.2d 508 (3d Dist. 1977).
30. Id. at 949, 367 N.E.2d at 511. This same reasoning convinced the court in Hahn v.
Hahn, 69 I11. App. 2d 302, 216 N.E.2d 229 (2d Dist. 1966), to remove the children from their
mother's custody after she began living with a married man. Although there was no evidence
that the mother neglected her children, her conduct was not deemed "conducive to the proper
moral training that children of tender years need." Id. at 305, 216 N.E.2d at 230.
31. 67 I11. App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 1979).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610 (1977).
33. See note 9 supra.
34. 67 I11. App. 3d at 767, 384 N.E.2d at 1003.
35. Id. at 770, 384 N.E.2d at 1004. The court asserted that the children should not be
raised in an environment which demonstrates to them that nothing is wrong with their mother
sleeping with her boyfriend. Id.
36. See Rippon v. Rippon, 64 I11. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (3d Dist. 1978) (mother's
moral indiscretions alone are not grounds for a change in custody where the children are not
affected); Christensen v. Christensen, 31 111. App. 3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581 (2d Dist. 1975)
(mother awarded custody of her children even though her relationship with her boyfriend was
technically adulterous because the conduct did not adversely affect the children). Other jurisdic-
tions have also used this approach. See In re Marriage of Moore, 35 Colo. App. 280, 531 P.2d
995 (1975); Torrance v. Torrance, 1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2456 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1975); In re
Burrell, 58 Ohio St. 2d 37, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979). See generally Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual
Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 647, 658-60 (1977).
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the presumption of unfitness approach, courts adopting the direct impact
approach do not speculate as to how the conduct may affect the child in the
future. For example, in Hendrickson v. Hendrickson,37 the court refused to
consider the possibility of future impact as it was not "substantial and im-
mediate enough to deprive the respondent of the custody of her chil-
dren." 8 Another court, 39 in determining that adulterous conduct on the
part of the mother did not warrant a change in custody, found authority for
its decision in IMDMA, which specifically states that parental conduct on the
does not affect the child should not be considered by courts in custody deci-
sions. 40 Courts that follow this approach also express a reluctance to impose
their personal views into custody cases of this nature. For example, one trial
court judge stated, "[wihile there is no doubt that my personal code of
morality might well be different from [the parent's], I don't think I can let
that enter into my decision." 41 Therefore, under the direct impact approach,
while courts may not condone the parent's activity, it is not a deciding fac-
tor.
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S OPINION
The recent trend in couples choosing cohabitation as an alternative to
marriage presented the Jarrett court with the contemporary issue of whether
a parent engaged in such a relationship can be deprived of the custody of his
or her child without proof of adverse effects on the child.42 The court
utilized both Illinois statutory law and prior case law to formulate its deci-
sion.
The majority first reviewed applicable Illinois statutory and case law con-
cerning modification of custody agreements. The court noted that IMDMA
reflects prior case law in that it gives primary consideration both to the
child's best interest 4 3 and to continuity in the child's environment.
44
37. 49 I11. App. 3d 160, 364 N.E.2d 566 (2d Dist. 1977).
38. Id. at 163-64, 364 N.E.2d at 569.
39. Holt v. Holt, 71 II1. App. 3d 87, 388 N.E.2d 1353 (4th Dist. 1979).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(b) (1977) (reproduced at note 8 supra). See Burris v.
Burris, 70 II1. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (5th Dist. 1979) (mother was allowed to retain
custody of her children although she was living with her boyfriend).
41. Burris v. Burris, 70 I11. App. 3d at 505, 388 N.E.2d at 813 (quoting the trial court's
opinion). This reluctance to interject personal attitudes in custody decisions was also prevalent
in Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 49 IM. App. 3d at 163, 364 N.E.2d at 569 ("[o]ur censorship of
the respondent's conduct, however, can properly relate only to its effect on the children").
42. 78 I11. 2d at 345, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b) (1977) provides that "[t]he court shall not modify a
prior custody judgment unless it finds . . . that the modification is necessary to serve the best
interest of the child." See Sommer v. Borovic, 69 II1. 2d 220, 233, 370 N.E.2d 1028, 1032
(1977) (the court's primary concern is the best interest of the child, not the wishes of the
parents); Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ili. App. 3d 401, 406-07, 320 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1st Dist. 1974)
(the sole objective of the court in reaching a decision is to protect the-best interest of the child).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b) (1977) stipulates that no modification in the custody
agreement will be made if a change of environment would be more detrimental to the child
[Vol. 29:11411146
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Further, IMDMA precludes a change in custody unless new conditions have
arisen since the entry of the original agreement.45 In addition, this change
in conditions must adversely affect the child's physical, mental, moral or
emotional health.46  Any conduct of the parent that does not affect his or
her relationship with the child will not justify a change in custody.4 7 Thus,
IMDMA mandates that courts focus on the child and the effects of parental
conduct on the child.
The court next examined the legality of cohabitation under Illinois law.
Relying on the Illinois fornication statute 4 and IMDMA, 49 the Jarrett
court found that open cohabitation violates the moral standards of the
state. 50 The court noted that the Illinois fornication statute explicitly pro-
hibits open and notorious nonmarital sexual activity. 51 Moreover, the court
found that IMDMA similarly proscribes cohabitation by persons of opposite
sexes. In this context, the court relied upon its recent decision in Hewitt v.
Hewitt 52 in interpreting the Act's purpose-"to strengthen and preserve the
than if the child remained in his or her present environment. See Bergan v. Bergan, 42 Ill.
App. 3d 740, 743, 356 N.E.2d 673, 676 (5th Dist. 1976) (finality of custody judgments is impor-
tant for the child to establish a stable environment); King v. Vancil, 34 111. App. 3d 831, 834-35,
341 N.E.2d 65, 68 (5th Dist. 1975) (children and parents are entitled to a certain degree of
finality in orders of custody).
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b) (1977) provides that "[tlhe court shall not modify a
prior custody judgment unless it finds . . . that a change has occurred in the circumstances of
the child or his custodian." See Nye v. Nye, 411 I1I. 408, 416, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952) (only
new facts which have occurred after the order has been issued will be considered); Vysoky v.
Vysoky, 85 II1. App. 2d 306, 309-10, 230 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1st Dist. 1967) (to justify a modification of
the decree there must be a showing that the parent is unfit to retain custody or that there has
been a change in circumstances).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b) (1977) specifies that "[t]he court shall retain the custo-
dian appointed pursuant to the prior judgment unless . . . the child's present environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health."
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(b) (1977) provides that "[tihe court shall not consider
conduct of a parent or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child." See
Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (3d Dist. 1978) (there was no need for a
modification of the custody agreement where the children were not affected by their mother's
nonmarital sexual conduct).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (1977) provides in part: "(a) Any person who cohabits or
has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if the behavior is open
and notorious. "
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 102 (1977) provides in part: "This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to: . . . (2) strengthen and
preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard family relationships."
50. 78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424. The Jarrett court noted that only open fornication
is subject to criminal sanctions because that type of conduct encourages others to violate the
statutorily expressed moral standards. Id.
51. See note 48 supra.
52. 77 I11. 2d 49, 66, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (1979). The plaintiff in Hewitt had lived with
the defendant in an unmarried, family-like relationship for fifteen years. During that period, the
plaintiff gave birth to three children, assisted the defendant in his career and performed the
duties of a wife and mother. Upon the termination of the relationship, the plaintiff claimed that
the conduct of both parties established an implied contract entitling her to one-half of the
property accumulated over the fifteen-year period. Id. at 53, 394 N.E.2d at 1205. She also
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integrity of marriage" 53 -as indicative of the Illinois legislature's unwilling-
ness to recognize cohabitation as an alternative to marriage. 54 By applying
these statutory standards, the Jarrett court found that Jacqueline's
cohabitational relationship with Wayne Hammon violated the moral stan-
dards of the state. 55 This adherence to statutory standards weakened Jac-
queline's argument that her conduct did not violate contemporary social
standards as indicated by the large number of people who live together out-
side the realm of marriage. 56 The court noted that using such statistics to
depict the standards of the state would nullify the Illinois fornication statute
as this statutory prohibition would then apply only to those persons who
agree with the statute and not to those who believe that fornication is not
immoral. 57
The Illinois Supreme Court then focused on the relationship between Jac-
queline's improper living arrangement and the question of custody, dispos-
ing of three arguments presented by Jacqueline. First, Jacqueline argued
that previous court decisions have allowed parents who violated the com-
munity's moral standards to retain custody of their children.58 The majority
conceded that courts have not denied custody to every parent who has in-
fringed these standards and recognized that past extramarital conduct by the
parent does not justify a denial of custody if no evidence is present to indi-
cate that the parent will engage in future indiscretions. 5 9  In the court's
view, however, Jacqueline's circumstances differed from such situations; she
admitted that she was living with Wayne Hammon at the time of the litiga-
tion and gave no indication that she would alter the arrangement. 60 The
claimed restitutionary relief under various theories, such as constructive trust. The Hewitt court
refused to acknowledge that an implied contract existed. Nor did the court employ equitable
remedies to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment. Instead, the court held that recognition
of the agreement would contravene the public policy established in IMDMA. Id. at 66, 394
N.E.2d at 1211. For a discussion of the practical implication of the Hewitt decision, see Grant
& Hyink, Caveat Amator: The State of Affairs in Illinois, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 493 (1980).
53. See note 49 supra.
54. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 I11. 2d at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
55. 78 Ii. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424. The court stated that Jacqueline's behavior clearly
violated society's norms because her relationship with Hammon was neither private nor dis-
crete. Id.
56. Jacqueline cited a 1978 Census Bureau statistic which showed that 1.1 million house-
holds in the United States were composed of an unmarried man and woman. Id. at 345, 400
N.E.2d at 424.
57. Id. at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
58. Id. at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
59. Id. The court noted that, in custody determinations, courts examine both the moral
example that each parent is currently setting and is expected to set in the future. Thus, as the
court stated in Nye v. Nye, 411 I11. at 415, 105 N.E.2d at 303, past moral indiscretions are
irrelevant as long as there is no indication of future lapses.
60. The continuity of Jacqueline's relationship was therefore the factor distinguishing the
situation in Jarrett from cases in which the Nye principle was utilized to leave custody with a
parent who had engaged in moral indiscretions. See Rippon v. Rippon, 64 I11. App. 3d 465, 381
1148 [Vol. 29:1141
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majority therefore found that the modification of the custody agreement was
justified on the grounds that the moral values continuously demonstrated by
Jacqueline to her children violated established standards of conduct and en-
dangered the healthy moral development of her children. 61
Jacqueline further argued that the trial court judge based his decision to
modify the custody agreement upon his own personal moral beliefs. Such a
predisposition, Jacqueline claimed, should instead be established by the
legislature. 62  The court rejected this contention, stating that the trial court,
in holding that Jacqueline's cohabitational relationship justified the removal
of her children from her custody, was adhering to principles established by
the legislature. 63
Finally, Jacqueline questioned the lower court's interpretation of section
610 of IM[)MA, alleging that the provision requires a showing of actual tan-
gible harm to children before a court can modify a custody agreement. 65 The
N.E.2d 70 (3d Dist. 1978); Strand v. Strand, 41 11. App. 3d 651, 355 N.E.2d 47 (2d Dist.
1976); Christensen v. Christensen, 31 11. App. 3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581 (2d Dist. 1975).
61. 78 I11. 2d at 347-48, 400 N.E.2d at 425. By holding that a parent's moral indiscretion
justifies a denial of child custody, the Illinois Supreme Court discredited three Illinois appellate
court decisions that held modifications of the custody agreement unsupported by parental indis-
cretions not affecting the children involved. The Jarrett court noted that the decisions in Burris
v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (5th Dist. 1979), and Rippon v. Rippon, 64 I11.
App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (3d Dist. 1978), had relied upon the appellate court's decision in
Jarrett and, therefore, were overturned by the supreme court's more recent decision in that
case. The third case discussed in this regard was In re Marriage of Farris, 69 I11. App. 3d 1042,
388 N.E.2d 232 (4th Dist. 1979), in which the appellate court modified a custody agreement
after it was shown that the children's father was better able to provide for them than their
mother. Although the modification was granted, the court reiterated the appellate court's hold-
ing in Jarrett: absent a showing of detrimental effect on children, a parent's extramarital sexual
relationship does not per se warrant a change in custody.
62. 78 I11. 2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
63. Id. The majority cited three cases, each of which held that open and notorious extramar-
ital sexual conduct violated moral standards established by the legislature. In People v. Searls,
13 I11. 597 (1852), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that open and notorious fornication was
prohibited as such a living arrangement was a public scandal that offended public decency. Id.
at 598. In People v. Potter, 319 I11. App. 409, 49 N.E.2d 307 (4th Dist. 1943), a white, married
man was convicted of adultery after he had lived with a black woman to whom he was not
married. The court stated that such brazen adultery and fornication were prohibited by statute
in order to conserve public morals. Id. at 413-14, 49 N.E.2d at 309. Finally, the Jarrett court
cited Lyman v. People, 198 II1. 544, 64 N.E. 974 (1902), in which a married man who had lived
with a single woman was found guilty of adultery. The couple had been seen entering the same
bedroom together, embracing in public and visiting the county fair together. This evidence
convinced the court that the couple was living together in a state of adultery. Id. at 549, 64
N.E. at 976.
Justice Goldenhersh was not convinced that cohabitation was contrary to the present public
policy. He found the majority's argument unconvincing because the three cases cited to define
the existing public policy were outdated. Further, Justice Goldenhersh observed that these
cases more clearly represent the prevailing prejudice against interracial sexual relations at the time
they were decided rather than current Illinois public policy. 78 I11. 2d at 351, 400 N.E.2d at
426-27 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
64. 78 I11. 2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
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majority countered that Jacqueline's conduct might encourage her children
to enter into a similar relationship in the future. 65 The environment, there-
fore, endangered the children's moral health and justified a modification of
the original custody agreement. 66  Recognizing, however, that no actual
harm to the children had been shown, the court reasoned that the effect on
Jacqueline's children of her cohabitation with Wayne Hammon may not be-
come apparent until the children matured. For this reason, the court found
it necessary to take preventative measures to safeguard the moral well-being
of the children. 67
Finally, the court distinguished the custody question raised in Jarrett from
Stanley v. Illinois.68 In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court held that
the State of Illinois could not create a statutory presumption that unmarried
fathers were unfit parents. Rather, such fathers had a due process right to be
granted hearings to determine their fitness as parents before being deprived
of custody of their children. 69 In contrast, Jacqueline was neither presumed to
be an unfit parent nor found unable to give her children affection and care.
Instead, custody was transferred to Walter Jarrett because the environment
in which Jacqueline was raising the children would be detrimental to their
"moral well-being" and because Walter was equally able to provide for the
children. In addition, the trial court had found him to be conducting himself
in a manner that did not contravene Illinois public policy. 70
CRITICISM OF JARRETT
The Jarrett decision is susceptible of criticism for three reasons. First, it
reduces the importance of the best interest standard in child custody
determinations. Second, it relies solely on a speculation that Jacqueline's
living arrangement will harm her children. Third, the decision infringes
upon Jacqueline's constitutional right to raise her children as she sees fit.
65. Id. at 346-47, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
66. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b)(3) (reproduced in part at note 9 supra). The court
noted that section 610 requires the trial court to consider whether the present environment
"endangers" the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health. The majority did not inter-
pret this provision of the statute to require a showing of actual harm to prove detriment to the
child's morals.
67, 78 Ill. 2d at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
68. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the unwed father of three children was denied custody
of his children after the death of the natural mother, with whom he had lived for eighteen
years. Under Illinois law, children of unwed fathers became wards of the state upon the death
of their mother.
69. Id. at 658. In Jarrett, Justice Moran, dissenting, found no distinction between the
statutory presumption that a father is unfit to have custody of his illegitimate children and the
judicially created presumption that Jacqueline is unfit to have custody of her children because of
her living arrangement. Thus, he asserted that the majority's decision was inconsistent with the
holding in Stanley because a hearing at which the determination of custody is based upon a
conclusive presumption is the same as having no hearing at all. 78 Ill. 2d at 353, 400 N.E.2d at
427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
70. 78 Ill. 2d at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426.
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Subordination of the Best Interest Standard
The Jarrett decision distorts child custody laws in order to further the
Illinois Supreme Court's effort to limit the rights of couples living together
without the benefit of a marriage license and thereby discourage cohabita-
tion. The court's decision in Jarrett compliments its earlier decision in
Hewitt v. Hewitt7 in that the supreme court, in both cases, focused on the
legislature's intent to "strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage." 72
The cases differ, however, as a third interest is involved in child custody
disputes, namely, the interest of the children of the dissolved marriage.
Basing its decision on the so-called immoral conduct of Jacqueline, the
court disregarded the best interest standard of child custody decisions. 73  In
so doing, the court ignored relevant considerations such as the preference of
the child, the relationship that the child has with each parent, and the stabil-
ity the child has in his or her present environment. 74  Justice Moran
pointed out in his dissent that the court, in effect, punished Jacqueline for
violating the state's "relevant standards of conduct." 75 Such harsh punish-
ment not only exceeds the statutory sentence for violation of the fornication
statute, 76 but it also degrades the child custody laws by subordinating the
welfare of the child to the court's implicit interest in punishing the par-
ent. 77 It is the innocent third party, the child, who is unduly injured.
71. 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 2-9 and accompanying text supra.
74. These considerations are specified in IMDMA. ILL. REV. STAT. eh. 40, § 602 (1977)
(reproduced at note 8 supra). See Jines v. Jines, 63 Ill. App. 3d 564, 380 N.E.2d 440 (5th Dist.
1978) (mature child's preference is a proper factor to be considered by the court in child cus-
tody proceedings); Holloway v. Holloway, 10 I11. App. 3d 662, 294 N.E.2d 759 (1st Dist. 1973)
(stability of the environment was found to be an important factor in determining the best inter-
est of the child); Filipello v. Filipello, 130 I11. App. 2d 1089, 268 N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist. 1971)
(psychiatrist's testimony showing that children got along with mother but not with father was
allowed as evidence in custody hearing).
75. 78 I11. 2d at 353, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
76. Fornication in Illinois is classified as a Class B misdemeanor. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-8 (1977). Offenses that violate § 11-8 are punishable by imprisonment for not more than six
months or imposition of a fine not to exceed $500, or both. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-8-3(a)(2), -9-1(a)(3) (1977).
77. Justice Goldenhersh, in his dissent, stated that the majority did not find Jacqueline an
unfit parent, but instead, removed the children from her custody because the court found her
guilty of fornication. He observed that the court's decision contradicts the established rule that a
custody agreement cannot be modified without a showing that the parent to whom custody was
originally awarded has become unfit to retain custody, or that a change of conditions has made a
change of custody in the child's best interest. 78 Ill. 2d at 351-52, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Gol-
denhersh, J., dissenting).
Punishment of the parent has never been condoned as a consideration in custody disputes. In
Jingling v. Trtanj, 99 I11. App. 2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 39 (5th Dist. 1968), the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Fifth District stated:
IT]he paramount question as to custody of children in divorce proceedings is not
what the parents wish, not who was wrong or who was right when the decree was
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Reliance on a Speculative Harm
The majority's contention that an unmarried live-in environment will seri-
ously injure the children's moral health is far too speculative to justify a
modification of the custody agreement. As Justice Moran suggested in his
dissent, the majority's reliance on IMDMA to determine that the environ-
ment in which the children were being raised harmed their moral well-being
was misplaced. 78  IMDMA expressly provides that courts are not to consider
conduct of the custodian which does not affect his or her relationship with
the child. 79 It must be noted that there was no evidence in Jarrett that the
children were adversely affected by their mother's relationship. To the con-
trary, the evidence showed that the children were well provided for. The
Jarrett majority, therefore, based its decision on a presumption that Jac-
queline's living situation would harm her children.80
This presumption is unfounded. The effect of present experiences upon a
child's future development cannot be predicted. 8' Nevertheless, the Jarrett
court baldly proclaimed that, by living with their mother, the children will
have a tendency to engage in similar conduct in the future. Even if this
speculation were warranted,8 2 the court's solution of changing custody of the
children to the other parent does not totally alleviate the problem. As was
entered dissolving the marriage, not the punishment of the father or the mother,
but what is best for the child at the time custody is fixed.
Id. at 65-66, 241 N.E.2d at 41 (emphasis added) (quoting Schmidt v. Schmidt, 346 I11. App.
436, 105 N.E.2d 117 (1952)). See People ex rel. Irby v. Dubois, 41 I11. App. 3d 609, 354
N.E.2d 562 (5th Dist. 1976) (father awarded custody of children despite the fact that he had
initially obtained custody through deceptive means); Fears v. Fears, 5 II1. App. 3d 610, 283
N.E.2d 709 (5th Dist. 1972) (mother's use of marijuana may be an indiscretion; however, she
should not be punished by having her children taken away from her).
78. 78 I11. 2d at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
79. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(b) (1977) (reproduced at note 8 supra).
80. 78 I11. 2d at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting). This same argument was
presented by Justice Goldenhersh in his dissenting opinion. Justice Goldenhersh, noting the
absence of any evidence indicating that the environment had an adverse effect upon the chil-
dren, observed that the majority based its decision upon a "nebulous concept of injury to the
children's 'moral well-being and development.' " Id. at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 426 (Goldenhersh,
J., dissenting).
81. In his dissent, Justice Goldenhersh questioned whether any sociologist could attribute
the increase in cohabitation to parental example. Id. (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). See J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 49-52
(1973) (the authors state that no one, including psychoanalysts, can forecast the experiences,
events, and changes a child will encounter, and that it is equally impossible to predict how the
familial environment will reflect on the child's personality and character formation); Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeter-minancy, 39 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 226, 258 (1975) (the author maintains that even a judge who is fully aware of a
child's present environment and alternatives cannot make a prediction as to which alternative is
best for the child because, of the numerous competing theories of human behavior, none are
capable of making accurate predictions about the effect a given environment will have on the
child).
82. This would require a showing that all children exposed to a parent who engages in
nonmarital sexual activity suffer a particular adverse effect.
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noted in the concurring opinion of the appellate court's decision, 83 when the
custody agreement was modified, the children spent weekdays with their
father and weekends with their mother. The children, therefore, were still
aware of and exposed to their mother's relationship with Wayne Hammon.
Thus, the Jarrett court's solution to the problem is no solution at all; nothing
short of a complete termination of Jacqueline's visitation privileges would
eliminate the possibility of future harm to the children's morals.8 4
Infringement on Jacqueline's Parental Rights
Finally, the decision is open to criticism on the ground that, in its effort to
protect the Jarrett children's moral development, the Illinois Supreme Court
has infringed upon Jacqueline's right to raise her children as she sees fit.
While the court has a valid interest in the protection of the welfare of the
children, that interest may not exceed a parent's right to teach his or her
children moral values.8 5 The United States Supreme Court has held that
the state cannot interfere with certain aspects of family life.8 6 Accordingly,
one line of cases recognizes the right of parents to control their children's
education; 87 another protects the parental interest in guiding the religious
83. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 I11. App. 3d 932, 937-38, 382 N.E.2d 12, 17 (lst Dist. 1978) (Si-
mon, J., specially concurring).
84. Judge Simon observed that this approach was too "drastic and cruel" to even be con-
sidered. Id. at 938, 382 N.E.2d at 17 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
85. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
86. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923). The state does have
power to intervene in certain parental decisions to protect the welfare of the child. As the Court
stated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "the family itself is not beyond regula-
tion in the public interest .... Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulat-
ing or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways." Id. at 166. See generally Note,
State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383,
1399-402 (1974).
87. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court invalidated a state statute that
prohibited the teaching of modern languages in elementary school. Although the issue con-
cerned the rights guaranteed to teachers by the fourteenth amendment, the majority's decision
was heavily influenced by the rights of parents. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]o marry,
establish a home and bring up children" is a form of liberty protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 399. This position was reiterated two years later in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), where the Supreme Court explicitly limited state
intervention in child-rearing decisions. In Pierce, the Court voided a statute which required
parents to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public schools. The Court
described the statute as an unreasonable interference with the rights of parents to "direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 534-35. The Pierce Court
further noted that "[tihe child is not a mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations." 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). For a further discussion of Meyer and Pierce,
see Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme
Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 805-06 (1978).
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upbringing of children. 88 Similarly, the Supreme Court has indicated that
parents have some control over the moral development of their children.
Relevant in this regard is Ginsberg v. New York. 89 There the Court upheld
the state's right to regulate the sale of obscene material to minors9 0 because
it recognized that the state has an interest in the moral development of its
youth. 91 The Court noted, however, that the statute did not bar parents
from purchasing the materials for their children. 92 Thus, the state's concern
in safeguarding its youths' morals could not extend beyond parental guidance
in this area. 93
Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court relieved Jacqueline Jarrett of her
parental authority after concluding that the example she was setting for her
children contravened the state's "relevant standards of conduct." 94  The
majority thereby elevated the state's concern for its youth over Jacqueline's
right as a parent. In so doing, the court gave the state a potentially unlim-
ited power to interfere with parental decisions involving the child's moral
instruction. Clearly, this imposition is contrary to the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Ginsberg that parents have the right to teach their
children sexual mores. 95
88. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court struck down a compul-
sory school attendance law because it conflicted with Amish religious beliefs. The state argued
that its interest in compulsory education outweighed Amish religious practices. The Court,
however, held that the state's interest
is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights
and interests such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the reli-
gious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare
[them] for additional obligations." 268 U.S. at 535.
Id. at 214. For a discussion of Yoder, see Note, An Expansion of The Free Exercise Clause:
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 37 ALB. L. REV. 329, 334-40 (1973).
89. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
90. The defendant was found guilty of violating a New York statute which prohibited the
sale to minors of materials defined to be obscene on the basis of its appeal to minors. Id. at
631-32.
91. Id. at 639-40. The Court gave two justifications for this interest. First, parents are enti-
tled to the support of laws designed to protect their children's well-being. Second, the statute
was reasonably related to the state's objective of safeguarding their youth. Id. at 639, 643. See
also Note, Constitutional Law-Obscenity-Materials May Be Obscene for Minors without
Being Obscene for Adults, 21 VAND. L. REv. 844, 848-49 (1968).
92. 390 U.S. at 639.
93. The right of parents to instruct their children in matters concerning nonmarital sexual
conduct may be protected by the Constitution. In Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S.
678 (1977), the Court struck down a state statute which, in part, prohibited the sale of con-
traceptives to minors. Several members of the Court acknowledged that the statute was
unconstitutional as it interfered with parental child-rearing rights. Justice Powell noted that
"this provision prohibits parents from distributing contraceptives to their children, a restriction
that unjustifiably interferes with parental interests in rearing their children." Id. at 708 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens also agreed that "the
statute may not be applied ...to distribution by parents." Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
94. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 87-91 and accompanying text supra.
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IMPACT
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Jarrett has shifted the burden of
proof needed to warrant a modification of the custody agreement from the
non-custodial parent to the custodial, cohabitating parent. Modification hear-
ings not involving parental nonmarital sexual activity require that the party
seeking a change in custody prove changed circumstances that necessitate
removing the children from their present environment. 96 By imposing a
presumption of unfitness on a parent who is engaged in a cohabitational
relationship, the Jarrett court has carved out an exception to this rule.
Absent the presumption that a cohabitating parent is unfit to retain cus-
tody of his or her child, the non-custodial parent has the burden of proving
that the child's home environment is detrimental to his or her moral well-
being. The Jarrett decision shifts this burden of proof by assuming that a
child who is reared by a cohabitating parent will emulate the parent's con-
duct.9 7 In essence, to retain custody of the child, a cohabitating parent is
required to show that the environment does not affect the child's develop-
ment. The significance of this exception to the modification rule lies in the
difficulty, if not impossibility of establishing such proof.98 Thus, in the fu-
ture the cohabitating parent will be left without any judicial relief once the
non-custodial parent asserts that his or her child's moral development is
being injured by exposure to an environment where people are living to-
gether while unmarried.
Moreover, aside from ensuring that a cohabitating, unmarried parent will
lose custody should the non-custodial parent object to the living arrange-
ment, the decision will be difficult for lower courts to implement. The su-
preme court did not provide a feasible alternative in situations where both
parents are living with members of the opposite sex or where one parent is
engaged in a cohabitational relationship and the other is unfit to be a custo-
dial parent. 99  In these situations, the court's presumption of unfitness ap-
proach would render both parents incapable of assuming custody of the
child. Unless the child was removed to the care of a non-parent or social
agency of the state, 100 a new approach would have to be implemented.
96. See McWilliams v. McWilliams, 43 I11. App. 3d 65, 356 N.E.2d 1124 (2d Dist. 1976);
Brady v. Brady, 26 I11. App. 3d 131, 324 N.E.2d 645 (5th Dist. 1975); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 25 II1.
App. 3d 175, 323 N.E.2d 21 (1st Dist. 1974).
97. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
98. See note 81 supra.
99. For example, in Burris v. Burris, 70 I11. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (5th Dist. 1979),
the appellate court was confronted with making a choice between a mother who was living with
her boyfriend and a father who, due to physical disability, was supporting a new wife and four
children with social security benefits. The court held that because there was no showing that
the mother's cohabitational relationship with her boyfriend was detrimental to the children, she
should retain custody. Id. at 508, 388 N.E.2d at 815. It should be noted that the Jarrett court
explicitly invalidated the Burris decision because Burris relied upon the overruled appellate
decision in Jarrett. 78 Ill. 2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
100. These alternatives may have harmful effects on the child's development. See Howe,
Development of a Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement: A Case Study in Law
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Thus, the court's failure to establish a policy which would be applicable in
circumstances different than Jarrett may create confusion in future litigation.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
The primary aim in child custody decisions is to place the child in an
e'nvironment that best promotes his or her welfare. Although the fact that a
parent is living with a person of the opposite sex may be a relevant con-
sideration in reaching this goal, it should not create a presumption that the
cohabitating parent is unfit to retain custody of his or her child. Indeed, the
Illinois legislature mandated in IMDMA that courts consider all pertinent
factors in selecting the environment that will be most conducive to the best
interest of the child. 10 1 This legislative intent precludes determinations of
custody based upon a single factor.
In light of IMDMA mandates, the Illinois Supreme Court should have
used a standard that weighs a parent's nonmarital relationship along with
other pertinent factors that affect a child's well-being. Thus, each parent's
marital status should be only one of several considerations for a court to
evaluate in custody decisions rather than the controlling factor. Unlike the
presumption of unfitness approach, this method would not ignore considera-
tions such as the child's preference, his or her relationship with each parent,
or the child's adjustment to his or her present environment.10 2 These ele-
ments would be combined with the marital status of each parent in the
court's determination of which parent would best promote the welfare of the
child. Therefore, even if a parent was cohabitating with a person of the
opposite sex, he or she would not be barred automatically from retaining
custody of the child.
This weighing of factors approach would also limit judicial speculation in
custody decisions. l0 3 By encouraging courts to give consideration to other
factors in making the custody decision, the weighing of factors approach
and Social Planning, FAM. L.Q. 257, 274 (1979) (citing statistics which show that, while the
number of children placed in foster care is increasing, the number of adoptive placements has
been declining; therefore, many children who are placed in the state's care are left without a
family home); Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to
State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213, 224 (1979) (the author notes
that children who are placed in foster care are often transferred three or more times within a
five year period and are frequently placed in homes geographically distant from their natural
parents and that such multiple transfers preclude the stability in the child's environment which
is necessary for successful development).
Although an environment in which a parent is living with a person not his spouse may seem
detrimental to the child's moral well-being, it does provide the child with a stable home and the
care of a natural parent. When the alternatives to leaving the child in the cohabitating parent's
custody are considered, this speculative harm does not justify placing the children in the care of
the state.
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (1977) (reproduced at note 8 supra).
102. See notes 3-9 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 78-84 and accompanying text supra.
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would emphasize the determinable needs of the child, not the unpredict-
able effects of a parent's cohabitational relationship on the child. Unlike the
direct impact approach, however, the concern over the child's moral de-
velopment would not be totally disregarded. Rather, it would be put into
perspective as other considerations, such as the child's physical, mental and
emotional needs, also assume significance in these custody decisions.
CONCLUSION
In the interest of discouraging cohabitation by restricting the rights of
couples engaged in such relationships, the Illinois Supreme Court has in-
fringed upon the rights of both the parents and children who are involved in
custody disputes. The Jarrett decision eroded the best interest of the child
standard by focusing on the moral well-being of the children to the exclusion
of other pertinent factors that contribute to the child's welfare. Further, the
court substituted the state's moral judgment for that of the parent, thereby
abrogating significant, and arguably constitutional, interests a parent may
have in the moral instruction of his or her child.
The Jarrett court's invocation of a presumption that a parent who is en-
gaged in a cohabitational relationship is unfit to retain custody of his or her
child is based upon the speculation that the child will imitate the parent's
conduct. Removing a child from his or her home because of this presump-
tion contradicts the best interest of the child standard. A more appropriate
approach would consider all factors that contribute to the child's well-being
This approach would be consistent with the best interest of the child stan-
dard as it would consider all the factors specified in IMDMA. Such a weigh-
ing of factors method would assure that, in all cases, a child is placed in an
environment which best promotes his or her welfare.
Nancy J. Vottero
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